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INTRODUCTION

As I write in the winter of 2020, the health, fiscal, and, frankly,
humanitarian crises confronting U.S. cities continue unabated. The
COVID-19 pandemic has required local governments to spend more
to retrofit public spaces, increase cleaning frequency and protocols,
and expand the work of public health departments. In addition, many
local communities have allocated funds to address deepening problems
of poverty and hunger and have provided cash assistance to struggling
local businesses.1 Meanwhile, local revenue collections shrank
*

Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University. I would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for
organizing such a terrific symposium and for providing valuable feedback on this
Essay, as well as my co-panelists Nestor Davidson, Blaine Saito, and Darien Shanske
for stimulating such an exciting conversation. I also want to acknowledge the
thoughtful questions raised by Gaga Gondwe. Sean Dix provided excellent research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., DHCD Tenant-Based Rental Assistance Program, GOV’T D.C.,
https://coronavirus.dc.gov/page/dhcd-tenant-based-rental-assistance-program
[https://perma.cc/6A3E-SV7Q] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Fair Housing/COVID-19
Emergency
Assistance
Program,
CITY
OF
SAN
ANTONIO,
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significantly. While not as deep as predicted in March 2020, cities face
considerable budget shortfalls. To take a few headline numbers, New
York City faces a $3.8 billion shortfall;2 in October 2020, Chicago
predicted a $1.2 billion shortfall;3 and as of December 2020, Los
Angeles officials were struggling with a $675 million shortfall,4 while
San Diego faced an $86 million shortfall.5
The pandemic has been especially harsh on the economies of large
urban areas. However, even smaller urban communities face
significant shortfalls.6 Meanwhile, a meaningful federal response was

https://www.sanantonio.gov/NHSD/Programs/FairHousing [https://perma.cc/HXV662GY] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); Anthony Derrick, Mayor Jenny Durkan Announces

Initial 250 Grantees of the Small Business Stabilization Fund, Calls on Private Sector
and Philanthropy to Help Support Future Grants, OFF. MAYOR (Apr. 13, 2020),

https://durkan.seattle.gov/2020/04/mayor-jenny-durkan-announces-initial-250grantees-of-the-small-business-stabilization-fund-calls-on-private-sector-andphilanthropy-to-help-support-future-grants [https://perma.cc/JPM7-A5PJ]; Small
DENVER,
Business
Emergency
Relief
Fund,
https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Departments/Economic-DevelopmentOpportunity/Pandemic-Relief-Recovery/Small-Business-Emergency-Relief-Fund
[https://perma.cc/XB4L-MY7J] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). My research assistant,
Diego Brito, put together a more comprehensive list of these programs. It is on file
with the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
2. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Jeffery C. Mays, Pandemic’s Fiscal Toll on New
York
City:
5
Takeaways,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/nyregion/coronavirus-budget-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/X795-QXG7].
3. See Fran Spielman, City’s Proposed Budget Will Erase $1.2 Billion Shortfall —
and Without More Federal Help, Top Mayoral Aides Say, CHI. SUN TIMES (Sept. 3,
2020, 12:30 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/9/3/21420104/chicagobudget-2021-federal-strimulus-replacement-revenue-lightfoot [https://perma.cc/46SJZ6FP].
4. See David Zahniser, L.A. Vowed to Cut Police and Help Disenfranchised
Areas. Now That Plan Is Under Fire, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020, 6:38 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-12-09/lapd-funds-george-floyddisenfranchised-areas-plan-underfire#:~:text=Six%20months%20ago%2C%20following%20massive,police%20spendin
g%20by%20%24150%20million [https://perma.cc/PGP2-5SQ2].
5. See David Garrick, San Diego Faces Large Budget Deficits as Pandemic
Shrinks Tax Revenues, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2020, 5:46 PM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/politics/story/2020-11-18/san-diegofacing-large-budget-deficits-as-pandemic-shrinks-tax-revenues
[https://perma.cc/5A2B-M77Q].
6. See Dorian Hargrove, Alexis Rivas & Tom Jones, Small Cities with Large
Budget Shortfalls Find Little Help from CARES Act, NBC 7 SAN DIEGO (June 16,
2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/investigations/small-cities-withlarge-budget-shortfalls-find-little-help-from-federal-cares-act/2348284
[https://perma.cc/LX42-LNBU] (finding National City in San Diego County has
projected revenue loss of $4.8 million but only received $1 million from the CARES
Act); Michael A. Pagano & Christopher W. Hoene, City Budgets in an Era of
Increased Uncertainty: Understanding the Fiscal Policy Space of Cities, BROOKINGS
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slow to materialize. In a functioning federalist system, one might
expect the central state to quickly address state and local fiscal
challenges that are national in scope. Not only would such funds
ensure state and local governments had the money to invest in their
responses to the pandemic, but they would also prevent public sector
cuts that would otherwise deepen the economic recession. While
Washington managed to pass one round of stimulus for U.S. workers
and businesses,7 local governments began making cuts almost
immediately.8 At least some political leaders in Washington seemed to
believe that the current fiscal crisis confronting local governments is of
their own making.9 This kind of talk is obviously not grounded in
reality, though budget decisions made prior to the pandemic limit local
options to respond prudently. The American Rescue Plan passed in
March of 2021 provides meaningful federal dollars to assist local

INST. (July 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/city-budgets-in-an-era-ofincreased-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/489W-2C8G] (arguing that most urban areas
lack the taxing authority and flexibility to respond to a financial crisis and that the size
of any federal response should be based on the constraints placed on each city);
Associated Press, ‘We Need Help’: Small Cities Face Fiscal Calamity from
Coronavirus, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/worldnation/story/2020-06-10/we-need-help-small-cities-face-fiscal-calamity-from-virus
[https://perma.cc/D2SZ-XMJZ] (“The federal CARES Act sent $150 billion to states
and the nation’s most populous cities and counties to help them pay for expenses
related to the virus outbreak. But only 36 cities met the population threshold of 500,000
or more to qualify for the money.”).
7. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 2104(b)(1), 134 Stat. 281, 318 (2020) (expanding unemployment insurance eligibility
and providing an additional $600 in unemployment benefits per week); § 6428, id. at
335 (making immediately available a refundable tax credit termed an “Economic
Impact Payment” of $1,200 for eligible adults and $500 for up to two children per
household).
8. See David Harrison, State, Local Governments Slashed Spending After
COVID. Next Year Could Be Worse., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-local-governments-slashed-spending-after-covidnext-year-could-be-worse-11606669200 [https://perma.cc/49Q6-KCPV] (“State and
local government spending on public services fell at a seasonally adjusted annual rate
of 3.7% in the third quarter from the second, according to the Commerce Department.
That followed a 6% decline in the second quarter, the sharpest since 1952.”).
9. See Eric Levitz, The GOP’s Big Lie About Why COVID Relief Talks Failed,
N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/08/republicanscovid-stimulus-negotiations-fiscal-aid-states.html
[https://perma.cc/2926-2786];
Christina Wilkie, Trump Says Coronavirus ‘Bailouts’ for Blue States Are Unfair to
Republicans,
CNBC
(May
5,
2020,
3:56
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/05/coronavirus-trump-says-blue-state-bailouts-unfairto-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/X8QR-YWN5] (“‘We’re not interested in
solving their pension problems for them, we’re not interested in rescuing them from
bad decisions they’ve made in the past,’ McConnell said in a televised interview in late
April.”).
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governments with revenue shortfalls, but delays in this assistance
complicated local governments’ response to the pandemic.10
The current recession is an unlikely place to draw meaningful lessons
about local fiscal health and local financial crises. The fiscal challenges
currently confronting urban areas in the United States are sui generis.
We are facing a global economic contraction, unprecedented since the
Great Depression, driven by public health regulation and advice that
discouraged consumer spending.11 Rebuilding the economy requires
an effective public health response,12 and the speed at which urban
environments will recover will depend on how quickly residents and
tourists feel it is safe to resume normal life. Scientists have produced a
miracle: vaccines that are 90% effective in record time.13 But how
quickly this miracle will result in meaningful public health
improvements in the United States remains to be seen, as the vaccine
rollout was slow and uneven in its early days.14
In the fall of 2020, I flew to New York City for less than 24 hours to
attend a shiva. When will I feel comfortable doing that again? When
will global travelers return in large numbers to New York? When will
a U.S. passport once again be a gateway to the world? These questions
are beyond the scope of this Essay and this symposium, but the answers
are at the heart of how long it will take for the U.S. economy (and that
of its urban areas) to recover and how such recovery might look.

10. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. (2021). Though
this Essay was published in the spring of 2021, it was written in the winter of 2020. The
world changed quickly. But it remains true that the ability of the federal government
to approve an aid package depended on the outcome of two Georgia run-off elections.
This is not a robust system of fiscal federalism, even if the aid dollars are currently
flowing.
11. See INT’L MONEY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UPDATE: A CRISIS LIKE
NO
OTHER,
AN
UNCERTAIN
RECOVERY
2
(2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020
[https://perma.cc/PP7V-LKWP] (“Economic data available at the time of the April
2020 WEO forecast indicated an unprecedented decline in global activity due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Data releases since then suggest even deeper downturns than
previously projected for several economies.”).
12. See id. at 12.
13. See Katie Thomas, David Gelles & Carl Zimmer, Pfizer Early Data Shows
Vaccine Is More Than 90% Effective, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/health/covid-vaccine-pfizer.html
[https://perma.cc/EP4W-9CFP].
14. See Rebecca Robbins, U.S. Officials Say Covid-19 Vaccination Effort Has
Lagged,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/health/covid-vaccines-slow-rollout.html
[https://perma.cc/HTK5-7U9G].
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Though this unique crisis is the result of public health measures, and
recovery depends on the success of such measures, it has also exposed
the fragility of local revenue and highlighted the fissures in the U.S.
body politic. The problem of local revenue sufficiency is not new, nor
is the tendency of state and national leaders to blame local fiscal
problems on local choices alone rather than understand them to be the
result of decisions made at the local, state, and national levels.15
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the brokenness
of U.S. fiscal federalism, which has both devolved significant
responsibility to local governments and left them without the fiscal
tools commensurate with this responsibility. Part II discusses the ways
that local governments have sought to secure own-source revenue in
the context of declining state aid and state-imposed revenue
restrictions, including the choices cities have made or are considering
in their fiscal year budgets for 2021. Part III argues that if localities are
really on their own, they should be given the fiscal tools necessary to
respond to local problems, including significantly more taxing
authority.
I. FISCAL FEDERALISM IN DECLINE
A. Fiscal Federalism

Fiscal federalism is an account of how different levels of government
(federal, sub-federal, and local) raise and spend revenue.16 It cautions
against redistribution at the local level for fear that such policies will
drive exit, which is relatively easy at the local level.17 (It is manifestly
harder to expatriate than to move to suburbia). As a result,
conventional wisdom suggests that the national government should pay
for redistribution.18
In the United States, the federal government can also more easily
spend counter-cyclically. While other countries allow sub-federal
governments to borrow,19 in the United States, balanced-budget
requirements restrict state governments’ ability to engage in

15. See infra Part I.
16. See Richard M. Bird, Fiscal Federalism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION
AND TAX POLICY 146, 146–47 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005).
17. See id. at 147.
18. See id.
19. Canadian provinces, for example, can borrow. See Kyle Hanniman, COVID19, Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Debt: Have We Reached a Critical Juncture?, 53
CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 279, 279 (2020).
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countercyclical spending.20 Thus, conventional fiscal federalism
assumes that a central state would lead the response both to a global
public health crisis caused by an easily communicable disease and to its
resulting economic crisis. A federal government can more easily
coordinate the response by, for example, centralizing the purchase and
distribution of personal protective equipment and testing equipment.21
And governments with independent currencies can more easily borrow
to pay the costs of such a response.
The legal authority granted to local governments by state law
assumes functioning fiscal federalism. Such authority seems to
contemplate that local governments are chiefly responsible for
supplying local public goods and coordinating local services, including
trash collection, local parks, and public safety. The local property tax
imposes something akin to a benefits tax in that property values reflect
the value of such services to taxpayers, implicitly limiting
redistribution. But, of course, this is a vast oversimplification. In the
1950s and 1960s, policymakers called for local commuter taxes,
recognizing that commuters benefit from the services a city provides.22
The campaign for equity in education funding, including both litigation
and advocacy, has shifted thinking around education. As a result,

20. The vast majority of states have constitutional balanced budget requirements,
which prevent state deficit spending. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2 (2010),
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PP9-DNBX]. Forty states place additional restrictions on
borrowing. The details of these rules, and in particular what types of borrowing are
subject to these rules, vary considerably. See Kim Rueben & Megan Randall, Debt
Limits: How States Restrict Borrowing, URB. INST. (Nov. 2017),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/149161/debtlimits_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/44ZK-4D5U]. But see Darien Shanske & Davide
Gamage, The Case for State Borrowing as a Response to the Current Crisis, 97 TAX
NOTES ST. 1137, 1139–41 (2020) (suggesting more room for states to borrow than has
traditionally been believed).
21. Cf. Clary Estes, States Are Being Forced into Bidding Wars to Get Medical
Equipment to Combat Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/claryestes/2020/03/28/states-have-are-being-forced-intobidding-wars-to-get-medical-equipment-to-combat-coronavirus/?sh=1eacb1ae1cde
[https://perma.cc/52BU-J6FC] (describing the challenges states face vying for the same
resources); Susie Neilson, The Trump Administration Forced States to Bid eBay-Style
for Masks and Ventilators, According to an Explosive New Documentary, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/documentarytrump-made-states-bid-ebay-style-ppe-masks-2020-10
[https://perma.cc/5U4YKKZB].
22. See Glenn Pasanen, Bringing Back the Commuter Tax, GOTHAM GAZETTE
(Jan. 27, 2003), https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/transportation/1673bringing-back-the-commuter-tax [https://perma.cc/9AR6-VUWH].
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states now take on a much more significant role in funding what was
once commonly understood to be local public goods.23
Over the past several decades, political trends have further
undermined assumptions in the fiscal literature about the roles of
federal and sub-federal entities in funding government services.24
While the Affordable Care Act continues to be a significant, relatively
new source of distributive federal spending,25 Republican control of
the Senate and the filibuster had, until 2021, otherwise limited the
growth of federal anti-poverty efforts, even as the deficit grew, both
during recessionary and expansionary periods.26 Under President
Obama, Republicans in the Senate stood united in opposition to giving
the President any legislative victories, even for ones that involved
significant compromise on their part.27 The crowning achievement of
unified Republican control in Washington was what has come to be

23. See Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government
Finance, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1832 (2017) (“Since the early 1970s, largely

responding to state supreme court orders, legislatures have mandated vastly increased
state spending in poor school districts to reduce large inequalities in spending across
poor and rich locations.”).
24. See Yunji Kim & Mildred E. Warner, Shrinking Local Autonomy: Corporate
Coalitions and Subnational State, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 427, 428
(2018) (“We challenge the old theories of fiscal federalism, which assumed a rational
allocation of expenditure responsibilities across scales of government, with higher
scales of government shouldering redistributive functions and lower scales pursuing
development functions. . . . [T]he subnational state uses the federalist structure to
dump fiscal responsibilities to lower levels.” (citation omitted)).
25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); Tara McKay, The Social Costs of Repealing the ACA, HEALTH AFFS.
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059057/full/
[https://perma.cc/6YBQ-CP98] (discussing the distributive impacts of increasing
insurance access). But see STAN DORN, BOWEN GARRETT & JOHN HOLAHAN,
REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE ACA IS MODEST IN SCOPE 1 (2014),
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413023-Redistribution-Under-the-ACAis-Modest-in-Scope.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X86-HV67] (noting the modesty of the
ACA’s redistributive impact).
26. See Eduardo Porter, The Republican Party’s Strategy to Ignore Poverty, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/business/economy/astrategy-to-ignore-poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/2PGB-4VBS]
(discussing
Republican policy opposition to expanding safety net programs); David Wessel, How
Worried Should You Be About the Federal Deficit and Debt?, BROOKINGS INST. (July
8, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-worried-should-yoube-about-the-federal-deficit-and-debt/ [https://perma.cc/BE5P-Y25J] (showing deficit
growth since 2000).
27. See generally Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No,’ POLITICO (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/republican-party-obstructionismvictory-trump-214498 [https://perma.cc/S47D-ECWE] (discussing the “success” of this
strategy).
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known as the Tax Cut and Jobs Act,28 a policy that ballooned the deficit
while providing minimal benefits to low- and moderate-income
Americans.29 But how quickly things change. With the passage of the
American Recovery Plan, the 117th Congress committed itself to
broad-scale, anti-poverty measures, including tax provisions estimated
to reduce child poverty by more than 40%.30
In many states, however, legislative majorities skeptical of social
welfare spending remain ascendant. Republicans have a governing
trifecta (control of both the governorship and the state legislature) in
23 states as of the 2020 election, while Democrats have similar control
of only 15.31 Many of these Republican trifectas began in the early
2000s or even earlier.32 At the same time, political polarization has led
to a Republican party leadership almost uniformly hostile to tax
increases.33 Of course, Kansas’s bipartisan decision to roll back the
deep tax cuts imposed earlier this decade suggests that there are limits
to this tax-cut orthodoxy even among elected officials.34 Republican

28. Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
29. See William G. Gale, A Fixable Mistake: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2019/09/25/a-fixable-mistake-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/7YJ6M5WW] (discussing the deficit increase); Chye-Ching Huang, Fundamentally Flawed
2017 Tax Law Largely Leaves Low- and Moderate-Income Americans Behind, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/federaltax/fundamentally-flawed-2017-tax-law-largely-leaves-low-and-moderate-incomeamericans [https://perma.cc/2HKA-HSKC] (discussing the distributive impact).
30. See CBPP Staff, American Rescue Plan Act Will Help Millions and Bolster the
Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/american-rescue-plan-act-willhelp-millions-and-bolster-the-economy [https://perma.cc/U4JY-KARB].
31. See
State
Government
Trifectas,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas
[https://perma.cc/YR98-CMZT]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
32. See id.
33. See Vanessa Williamson, How Tax Cuts for the Wealthy Became Republican
Orthodoxy,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
21,
2017,
5:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/21/how-tax-cuts-forthe-wealthy-became-republican-orthodoxy/ [https://perma.cc/3QA7-9ET6].
34. See Russell Berman, The Death of Kansas’s Conservative Experiment,
ATLANTIC
(June
7,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/kansass-conservative-taxexperiment-is-dead/529551/ [https://perma.cc/KMZ6-HN4G]. The tax cuts that went
into effect in 2014 entirely eliminated the taxation of business income earned by
partnerships and other pass-through entities. Kansas tax revenue shrank by about 10%
in a single year. See Jeremy Hobson, Dean Russell & Samantha Raphelson, As Trump
Proposes Tax Cuts, Kansas Deals with Aftermath of Experiment, NPR (Oct. 25, 2017,
2:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/25/560040131/as-trump-proposes-tax-cutskansas-deals-with-aftermath-of-experiment [https://perma.cc/QN2N-WT8G].
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voters are actually more divided on this issue. Polling suggests that a
small majority of Republican registered voters support increasing taxes
on the super wealthy.35
Meanwhile, urban areas have grown more progressive, in part as a
result of a broader trend of spatialized political polarization and
demographic differences between rural and urban Americans.36 This
widening gap between urban political preferences and those of the
state and (and at times) national governments has meant that
redistributive policies supported by potentially large national
majorities and smaller state-level majorities lack support among
congressional and state-level legislative leadership. As a result of these
trends, it is not surprising that local leaders would be at the forefront
in responding to problems that require a strong public sector response.
For example, when President Trump announced he was pulling the
United States out of the Paris Climate Agreement, local leaders
committed themselves to implementing local policies to reduce U.S.
carbon admissions.37 Additionally, in many states, mayors and city
councils implemented mask mandates. Sometimes these local leaders
simply moved more quickly than state officials, but in too many cases,
these local leaders faced hostility and legal challenges from the state.38
B. Responsibility Without Fiscal Authority

For years, local governments have faced a rescaling of state
responsibility.39 As scholars Yunji Kim and Mildred E. Warner argued
in 2018, “[e]xpenditure responsibility for social welfare has shifted

35. See Christopher Ingraham, Republicans Support Higher Taxes on the SuperRich, According to a Fox News Survey, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:49 PM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/01/31/republicans-support-highertaxes-super-rich-according-fox-news-survey/ [https://perma.cc/3TJ4-DDW4].
36. See KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN,
SUBURBAN
AND
RURAL
COMMUNITIES
29–37
(2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/05/PewResearch-Center-Community-Type-Full-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9VJFVS8].
37. See Sarah Fox, Localizing Environmental Federalism, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
133, 140–50 (2020).
38. See, e.g., Daniel Arkin et al., More Than Half the Country Has Issued Mask
Requirements. See If There’s a Mandate in Your State, NBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020, 6:01
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/more-half-country-has-issuedmask-requirements-see-if-there-n1234182
[https://perma.cc/K8CC-EBCS];
Max
Cohen, Georgia Governor Sues to Stop Atlanta Mask Mandate, POLITICO (July 16,
2020, 6:41 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/16/georgia-mayors-briankemp-face-masks-366497 [https://perma.cc/5TFQ-F3HY].
39. See, e.g., Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at 427.

928

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

from the federal to the state level and increasingly to the local level.”40
This shift in responsibility has occurred as the pressures of tax and
expenditure limits and more general political support for lowering
taxes have shifted state spending. Even as local governments have
been asked to do more, state laws have not meaningfully increased
local access to revenue from the largest tax bases: property taxes,
general sales taxes, and income taxes.41
These pressures to rescale are particularly strong during recessions,
and the Great Recession accelerated this trend.42 However, even in
the most recent period of economic expansion, many local
governments faced fiscal pressures, as state aid was slow to recover
from Great Recession cuts.43 Admittedly, such pressure was not
universal. For example, prior to COVID-19, New York City’s budget
ballooned.44
For many years, astute policymakers and scholars have suggested
that local revenue needs be met with a reinvigorated property tax.45
Even though the property tax is the most important own-source
revenue stream for local governments,46 its share of local revenues has
been declining for decades.47 And it is far less important for large,

40. Id. at 428.
41. See generally Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing
Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292 (2016).
42. See Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at 429 (“State rescaling theory acknowledges
that power is shifted upward to international bodies, downward to subnational
governments and outward to private interests, a process which has intensified with
austerity since the Great Recession.” (citations omitted)).
43. See ‘Lost Decade’ Casts a Post-Recession Shadow on State Finances, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (June 4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/lost-decade-casts-a-post-recession-shadow-on-statefinances [https://perma.cc/WD7M-E6YU]; see also Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at
432.
44. See Jeff Coltin, What to Know About NYC’s $92.2 Billion Budget, CITY & ST.
N.Y. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-yorkcity/bill-de-blasio-2019-budget-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/36WY-2M6L] (New
York’s 2019 $92.2 billion budget was about $14 billion more than when Mayor deBlasio
took office).
45. See, e.g., DAVID BRUNORI, LOCAL TAX POLICY: A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE
(2013); JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX (2018).
46. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sourcesrevenue-localgovernments#:~:text=Local%20government%20revenue%20comes%20from,local%2
0general%20revenue%20in%202017 [https://perma.cc/3KGC-HAUU].
47. See IRIS J. LAV & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
STATE LIMITS ON PROPERTY TAXES HAMSTRING LOCAL SERVICES AND SHOULD BE
RELAXED
OR
REPEALED
4
(2018),
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general-purpose jurisdictions.48
Advocates of increasing local
dependence on the property tax, or perhaps more accurately, returning
to local dependence on the property tax, note that one of its more
attractive features is its stability: revenue from the property tax does
not change rapidly with corresponding changes in the economic cycle.49
For local governments that must balance budgets each year, this
stability provides a buffer to city budgets during economic downturns.
Property values are a lagging indicator in most recessions; they do not
fall as quickly as income or discretionary consumption.50 Further,
certain property tax assessment features reduce the impact of even
falling property values on assessments for tax purposes.51
However, in his recent work, scholar Andrew Hayashi noted that
this stability creates its own problems for homeowners, particularly
low-income homeowners, who find their property taxes remain
constant even as their incomes decline.52 Hayashi’s research suggested
that this burden forces homeowners to sell their property or otherwise
make difficult consumption choices.53 Scholars like Bernadette
Atuahene have highlighted the ways that property assessments are
disproportionately high for people of color and low-income property
owners.54 In light of these interacting trends, Hayashi and scholar Ariel
Jurow Kleiman have cautioned against raising property taxes as a first
response to the pandemic.55
In the absence of meaningful control over the property tax, it is
natural that local governments might turn to the other “main” tax bases
on which governments rely for own-source revenue, the sales and
income tax bases. While local government reliance on sales taxes has

https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-18-18sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2YR-5U9W].
48. See Tracy Gordon, Richard C. Auxier & Aravind Boddupalli, COVID-19 Has
Turned Much of What We Thought We Knew About City Finances Upside Down,
TAX POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/covid-19has-turned-much-what-we-thought-we-knew-about-city-finances-upside-down
[https://perma.cc/DK5L-3LD2].
49. See BRUNORI, supra note 45, at 47–48.
50. See id. at 47.
51. See Andrew T. Hayashi, Countercyclical Property Taxes, 40 VA. TAX REV. 1,
29–30 (2020).
52. See id. at 50.
53. See id. at 45.
54. See generally Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 107
(2020).
55. See Andrew Hayashi & Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Property Taxes During a
Pandemic, 96 TAX NOTES ST. 1461 (2020).
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increased over time,56 local sales taxes piggyback on state sales taxes
and share many of their undesirable design features, most notably a
narrow base.57 As for local income taxes, the vast majority of local
governments simply do not have the authority to levy such taxes.58
As a result of long-term demographic trends, residents of urban
jurisdictions are frequently more supportive of an active public sector
than residents of states as a whole. As a result, local officials and
policymakers have embraced a leadership role created in the vacuum
of state and federal inaction. In taking up this mantle, however,
localities often find themselves resource-constrained, as this Section
discussed. As a result, local governments have turned increasingly to
more limited revenue sources to make ends meet.
II. MAKING ENDS MEET

Part I described the challenges local governments face in ensuring
tax revenue is adequate to fund the goods and services constituents
desired. This Part considers some of the strategies local governments
have adopted to keep budgets balanced. Section II.A looks at the
growth of “miscellaneous” sources of revenue. Section II.B considers
non-revenue budget solutions: borrowing and cutting spending.
A. Other Revenues

In the absence of meaningful control over their most significant tax
bases, including property taxes, general sales taxes, and income taxes,
local governments are more reliant than state and federal governments
on what often appears as “miscellaneous taxes/revenue” on budget
charts.59 In 2017, “charges,” “miscellaneous revenue,” and “other
taxes” accounted for over a quarter of local government revenues
nationwide.60 Because school districts and other special districts are
more reliant on property taxes, the percentage is even greater for
56. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra note 46.
57. See BRUNORI, supra note 45, at 76. Part III discusses this problem further. See
text accompanying infra notes 152–59 (discussing problems with Philadelphia’s sales
tax).
58. See Pagano & Hoene, supra note 6.
59. Compare What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra
note 46, with What Are the Sources of Revenue for State Governments?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sourcesrevenue-state-governments [https://perma.cc/HHA2-2YVJ], and What Are the
Sources of Revenue for the Federal Government?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-federalgovernment [https://perma.cc/W4XK-LVF7].
60. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra note 46.
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general-purpose local governments such as cities, towns, and
counties.61 According to the Tax Policy Center, in the 906 largest cities
(those with populations over 50,000), 33% of local revenue comes from
charges, miscellaneous revenue, and other taxes.62 For this set of large
cities, an additional 5% of revenue is generated by selective sales
taxes.63 For the 67 U.S. cities with populations over 300,000, this share
is greater still: such revenue sources account for over 40% of local
revenue.64
These miscellaneous and other sources of revenue include parking
fees, business and event permits, traffic and other safety enforcement
fines, and tourism taxes and fees, which include air transportation
charges, hotel, and rental car taxes.65 The combination of revenue
sources is unique for every city, in part because of the choices local
voters and elected officials make and in part because each state
authorizes a different mix of local revenue options. Further, states
sometimes authorize different revenue options for different cities
within the state. In such cases, larger cities are usually given greater
revenue authority.
Consider the City of Atlanta. Its fiscal year 2020 budget predicted
$716.7 million in own-source revenue.66 Of that, 32.3% came from
property taxes, and 17% came from its local option sales tax.67 The
remaining 51% of Atlanta’s revenue came from miscellaneous revenue
sources, including public utility, alcoholic beverage, and other taxes;
license and permit revenue; charges for services; fines, forfeitures, and
penalties; building rentals and concessions; hotel and motel tax
revenue; and pilot and franchise fees.68 In addition, the city budget
predicted 5% of revenue would come from “indirect cost recovery” and
1% from what it called “other revenue.”69 Atlanta’s property tax
revenue includes real property taxes, real estate transfer taxes, and

61. See How Do State and Local Property Taxes Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May
2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-state-and-localproperty-taxes-work [https://perma.cc/Z93R-G4FP]; see also Gordon et al., supra note
48.
62. How Do State and Local Property Taxes Work?, supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See CITY OF ATLANTA, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ADOPTED BUDGET 89 (2020),
https://www.atlantaga.gov/home/showpublisheddocument?id=43234
[https://perma.cc/7YJY-ND4S].
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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intangible recording taxes, not simply the ad valorem property tax.70
The “other taxes” category includes insurance premium taxes and
motor vehicle taxes. “Other revenue” includes investment income and
revenue from the sale of city assets.71 Finally, “indirect cost recovery”
budgets as revenue the cost of services the city provides its own
departments.72 As the Atlanta budget document explains, this
recovery “allocates a portion of general services costs such as
purchasing, accounting, budgeting, personnel administration, and
certain other indirect costs based on allocation methodology
determined by an independent cost allocation plan.”73
Denver, on the other hand, is far more dependent on its sales and
use tax. For fiscal year 2021, the proposed budget anticipated 55% of
revenue to be collected from the city’s sales and use tax, with only 12%
collected from its property tax.74 This is not surprising. Colorado’s
Taxpayer Bill of Rights, known as TABOR, is a significant constraint
on tax revenue, and the recently repealed Gallagher amendment
limited property tax revenue growth by locking in an assessment ratio
between commercial and residential property.75 After sales revenue,
miscellaneous revenue represents the next largest portion of Denver’s
budget; the city anticipates 20% of revenue coming from what the
budget terms “general government,” a category that includes licenses
and permits, fines and forfeits, cable franchise fees, interest income,
fees, charges for services, user charges, internal services and indirect

70. See id. at 90.
71. See id. at 91–94.
72. See id. at 95.
73. Id.
74. CITY & CNTY. OF DENVER, MAYOR’S PROPOSED 2021 BUDGET 78 (2020),
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/Budget/20
20/2020BudgetBook_Vol1-2-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/K79W-VQJH].
75. See TOM BROWN, CTR. FOR COLO. POL’Y STUD., THE EFFECTS OF TABOR ON
MUNICIPAL
REVENUES
AND
SPENDING
IN
COLORADO
(2001),
http://static.uccs.edu/ccps/sites/ccps/files/inline-files/Municipal%20Article.final_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJQ8-ND6L] (discussing the interaction of TABOR and the
Gallagher Amendment on municipal revenue); Aldo Svaldi, Colorado Homeowners

Have Among the Lowest Tax Rates in the U.S., but Businesses Say They’re Paying the
Price,
DENVER
POST
(Oct.
23,
2020,
1:16
PM),

www.denverpost.com/2020/10/23/colorado-amendment-b-property-tax-burdengallagher-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/6NSA-RE8W] (discussing the impact of the
Gallagher amendment on property taxes); Gallagher Amendment Repeal and
Property
Tax
Assessment
Rates
Measure
(2020),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Amendment_B,_Gallagher_Amendment_Repeal_a
nd_Property_Tax_Assessment_Rates_Measure_(2020)
[https://perma.cc/VLD5X692] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (reporting on repeal of the Gallagher amendment).
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costs, and investment services.76 An additional 8% of revenue is
projected from the occupational privilege tax, lodgers (hotel) tax,
motor vehicle taxes, and telecommunication taxes.77
To be sure, some cities are far less reliant on this miscellaneous
revenue. For example, Nashville projected that its property tax would
raise almost 60% of city revenue in the 2020–2021 budget year, and
over 30% of its revenue would be generated by the sales tax and
intergovernmental aid and grants.78 As a result, miscellaneous revenue
sources accounted for less than 10% of the city budget.79
As Tracy Gordon and her co-authors noted, prior to this recession,
cities that rely on more diverse revenue streams were generally seen as
winners in local fiscal policy.80 These localities had developed revenue
sources that responded to the shrinking property tax base by
supplementing property tax revenue with revenue from sales taxes and
other sources.81 However, for local governments that rely on sales
taxes — especially selective sales taxes — to supplement property tax
revenue, 2020 revenue projections fell far short of collection as
shutdown orders and consumer fear reduced consumption and tourism
fell dramatically.82
But such revenue models were under pressure even before the
pandemic. Over 15 years ago, scholar Laurie Reynolds trenchantly
criticized local reliance on user fees as a “you get what you pay for”
model of local government.83 She noted that local reliance on user fees
shifts both who gets local services and what kind of services local
governments can deliver, making it harder to provide services that
engage in redistribution or services that provide non-rival public
goods.84 Numerous challenges to local user fees have since been

76. See CITY & CNTY. OF DENVER, supra note 74, at 78–79.
77. See id.
78. METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CNTY., RECOMMENDED
OPERATING
BUDGET
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2020–2021
A-12
(2020),
https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Finance/docs/OMB/fy21_budget/Rec
ommended/FY21RecommendedBudgetBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3FZ-5RG9].
79. See id.
80. See Gordon et al., supra note 48.
81. See id.
82. See Christiana McFarland & Brenna Rivett, Cities Anticipate $360 Billion
Revenue
Shortfall,
NAT’L
LEAGUE
CITIES
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.nlc.org/article/2020/05/14/cities-anticipate-360-billion-revenue-shortfall/
[https://perma.cc/7A3Y-NTTC].
83. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get
What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004).
84. See id. at 407–15; see also Michael Hiltzik, The Next Crisis for California Will
Be the Affordability of Water, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 2017, 2:20 PM),
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brought by plaintiffs alleging that the fees are taxes in disguise given
that they are not calculated with the necessary precision to reflect the
costs incurred in providing the good or service for which the fee was
charged.85 While not all of these challenges have been successful, such
challenges collectively limit the government’s ability to adopt fee
schedules that fully reflect the costs borne by the city or the services
the city offers.86
A separate and significant body of scholarship criticizes local use of
and reliance on criminal justice and traffic fines and fees.87 Such fines
and fees reflect the racial disparities endemic to our criminal justice
system. People of color are much more likely to face such fines and
fees in part as a result of enforcement disparities.88 However, other
factors contribute to the problem as well. One study suggested that the
“one demographic that was most characteristic of cities that levy large
amounts of fines on their citizens [is] a large African American
population.”89 According to that study, “[a]mong the fifty cities with
the highest proportion of revenues from fines, the median size of the
African American population — on a percentage basis — is more than
five times greater than the national median.”90
Those with low incomes face potentially significant financial
obstacles due to this regressive method of raising revenue. Not only
are the fines and fees a much larger share of income for those living at
or close to the poverty line, those lacking the funds to immediately pay
these fines must often bear high interest rates and pay fees to enter

https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-water-afford-20170709story.html [https://perma.cc/Z4MT-8TSU] (discussing the way Proposition 218 limits
the ability of water districts to subsidize pricing).
85. See generally Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168 (2018).
86. See id.; see also Jason Ruiz, Tied Up in Appeals, Litigation over Water Fees
Could Deepen City’s Fiscal Pain, LONG BEACH POST NEWS (July 29, 2020, 3:55 PM),
https://lbpost.com/news/tied-up-in-appeals-litigation-over-water-fees-could-deepencitys-fiscal-pain [https://perma.cc/2RKN-MAZD] (discussing challenges facing Long
Beach during the pandemic because of legal challenges to its water fee structures).
87. See, e.g., Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees, 71 HASTINGS
L.J. 517 (2020).
88. See BACK ON THE RD. CAL., STOPPED, FINED, ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS IN
POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 21 (2016), http://ebclc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NY6P-8LKG].
89. Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016),
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/
[https://perma.cc/EM3GGRA7].
90. Id.
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repayment programs.91 In far too many jurisdictions, failure to pay
such fines and fees can result in the suspension of driver’s licenses,
making it more difficult for those individuals to commute to work.92 In
some jurisdictions, failure to pay can even result in incarceration, which
in a sad irony can result in additional fines and fees.93
At least in some jurisdictions, enforcement priorities reflect
jurisdictions’ search for revenue. In the wake of the shooting of
Michael Brown by a Ferguson, Missouri, police officer, the U.S.
Department of Justice investigated Ferguson’s Police Department.
That investigation uncovered damning emails that revealed both casual
racism in daily correspondence and the importance of revenue in
Ferguson policing decisions.94 But not all of this budgeting happens in
secret.
Chicago tried to balance its budget using additional
enforcement revenue.95
Finally, many local governments rely on a set of selective sales taxes
and user fees imposed primarily on tourists and the tourist industry.96
The taxes include room occupancy taxes, lodging taxes, a variety of
rental car fees and taxes, and taxes on restaurant meals that are also
borne by locals.97 Because such taxes are paid by non-residents, they
have proven politically popular. In recent years, both state and local
governments have increasingly imposed or raised tourist taxes.98
However, this has been an especially terrible year for tourism.99 As a
91. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 3 (2015).
92. See id. at 4.
93. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES
OF COLOR 38 (2017).
94. See C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015).
95. See Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s ‘Pandemic Budget’ for 2021 Cleared the Chicago
City Council. Here Are 5 Things to Know, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2020, 5:40 PM)
[hereinafter Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s ‘Pandemic Budget’ for 2021],
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-cb-chicago-lightfoot-city-budget-fivethings-20201124-qb7kajivovf57nwjsuaj4o3l3e-story.html
[https://perma.cc/L42NSW7J].
96. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., REVENUE
DIVERSIFICATION:
STATE
AND
LOCAL
TRAVEL
TAXES
(1994),
https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/M-189.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4K9-AXEZ].
97. See id. at 2.
98. See Elaine S. Povich, States Lure Tourists, Then Tax Them, PEW CHARITABLE
TRS.
(June
15,
2015),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/6/15/states-lure-tourists-then-tax-them
[https://perma.cc/J8PD-8PU5].
99. See Barb Rosewicz & Mike Maciag, Pandemic-Driven Declines in Tourism
Take Toll on Many States’ Revenues, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Oct. 14, 2020),
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result, jurisdictions for which out-of-town visitors play a significant role
in revenue find themselves struggling with significant unemployment
within the tourism industry and sharply reduced tax revenue.100
But local reliance on tourism taxes creates problems even when local
governments are not facing a global pandemic. For one thing, tourism
is quite cyclical, so revenue from tourism taxes can fall quickly in
economic downturns. In the long economic expansion from the end of
the Great Recession to March 2020, tourism was, of course, a growth
industry;101 however, the Great Recession was also a period of
significant decline in both business and leisure travel.102 The cyclical
nature of tourism taxes is not the only problem with this revenue
source. Not all jurisdictions will be able to rely (or rely to the same
extent) on such revenues, and those cities without a significant tourism
industry cannot rely on tourism taxes. Not only does this produce clear
winners and losers, but it may also undermine potential intrajurisdictional efforts to reform local revenue options more broadly.
Further, recent events have brought a sea change in tourist patterns
to which local tax systems are only beginning to respond. The
emergence of transportation networking companies and the short-term
rental industry has threatened the dominance of the rental car and
hotel industries103 and the tax revenue these industries contribute to
the local budget.104 If the general sales tax was the primary mechanism

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2020/10/14/pandemicdriven-declines-in-tourism-take-toll-on-many-states-revenues
[https://perma.cc/ME2R-VXAM] (looking at the state budget picture, although a
similar analysis applies to cities).
100. See id.
101. See Hugo Martín, Coronavirus Could Inflict Biggest Blow to Travel Industry
Since Great Recession, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-06/coronavirus-travel-industry-greatrecession [https://perma.cc/ZJP7-4ZV3].
102. See Geoffrey Paulin, Travel Expenditures, 2005–2011: Spending Slows During
Recent Recession, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.: BEYOND NOS. (Dec. 2012),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/travel-expenditures-2005-2011-spendingslows-during-recent-recession.htm [https://perma.cc/5XRV-TSAX]; see also U.S.
TRAVEL ASS’N, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS TRAVEL IN THE U.S. ECONOMIC RECOVERY 7
(2015),
https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/media_root/5.2015_BizTravel_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4KF-Z3K7].
103. See Jiyong Park, How the Sharing Economy Changes the Tourism Landscape:
The Complementary Impacts of Airbnb and Uber/Lyft, PAC. ASIA CONF. ON INFO. SYS.
2, 3 (2020).
104. See Jordan E.A. Ferguson, Christy Gunvalsen & Rebecca L. Moon, Uber,

Airbnb and Municipalities: Maximizing New Tax and Licensing Revenue
Opportunities,
STRAFFORD
(Oct.
5,
2016,
1:00
PM),

http://media.straffordpub.com/products/uber-airbnb-and-municipalities-maximizing-
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for revenue raising, this shift might have had less of a budget impact.
But most tourist taxes are selective, meaning they apply only to
narrowly defined bands of activity. As a result, companies like Airbnb
and Uber have argued that they should not be subject to the taxes
imposed on their more traditional competitors.105 Legislation can
always catch up to these changing industry dynamics. Still, the sharing
economy has also proven itself adept at securing legislative victories
for itself at both the state and local levels.106 The ascendance of these
industries may suggest a potential limit to growth in tourism taxes.
As this Part suggests, local governments have been adept at finding
new sources of revenue to supplement traditional reliance on the
property tax. However, many of these revenue sources raise serious
issues of equity and stability.
Of course, growth in such
“miscellaneous” revenue is not the only option for cities facing fiscal
constraints. As the next Section discusses, local governments can both
borrow funds and cut services to make ends meet.
B. Other Budget Options: Borrowing and Shifting Funding Priorities

Raising own-source revenue via taxes and fees is not the only option
cities have for balancing their budgets. Cities can consider borrowing
and cutting spending as well. Cities also incur debt for capital costs,
i.e., the costs of building and maintaining long-lived assets like city
buildings and public roads,107 as it makes little sense to finance such

new-tax-and-licensing-revenue-opportunities-2016-10-05/presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FEF-ULZW]; Brian Hardzinski & Adam Brooks, ‘Gig Economy’
Businesses Like Uber, Airbnb a Complex Revenue Source for Oklahoma City, KGOU
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.kgou.org/post/gig-economy-businesses-uber-airbnbcomplex-revenue-source-oklahoma-city [https://perma.cc/93P8-NBSP]; Kirk Miller,
Your Uber Ride from the Airport May Get More Expensive. Here’s Why.,
INSIDEHOOK
(Feb.
19,
2020,
11:47
AM),
https://www.insidehook.com/daily_brief/travel/lyft-uber-airport-fees
[https://perma.cc/9CWV-LDLC].
105. See Jonathan J. Cooper, Official Says Phoenix Airport Ride-Hailing Fee Is
ABC
NEWS
(Jan.
16,
2020,
7:02
PM),
Illegal,
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/official-phoenix-airport-ride-hailing-feeillegal-68340156 [https://perma.cc/BZ2Q-U7KM]; Paris Martineau, Inside Airbnb’s
‘Guerilla War’ Against Local Governments, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-airbnbs-guerrilla-war-against-local-governments/
[https://perma.cc/PGC5-LLJB].
106. See generally Brad Stone, The $99 Billion Idea, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-uber-airbnb-99-billionidea/ [https://perma.cc/Q99L-NCVT].
107. See Policy Basics: State and Local Borrowing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-andtax/policy-basics-state-and-local-borrowing [https://perma.cc/63CN-XQV9].
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projects out of a single year’s revenue. However, borrowing to cover
operating expenses is generally viewed as a last resort of financially
desperate cities.108 Such borrowing only postpones a reckoning
between fiscal capacity and service provision — a reckoning made
more difficult as debt service adds additional costs but does not
contribute to current city services.109 In the context of this particular
recession, however, some scholars have argued that this traditional
advice should not be heeded given the pressing service needs and the
likelihood that investments in human services might forestall further
economic decline.110
Even if borrowing for operating expenses is generally controversial,
it is also quite common, at least in a sense. Underfunding pensions by
paying less into pension funds than a reasonable discount rate might
require is also a kind of borrowing against future revenues. Pension
obligations, of course, are not legal borrowing in the sense they are not
secured debt.111 Nevertheless, pensions, like borrowing to cover
operating costs, allow governments to fund current services without
current revenue because the full cost of providing those services is
delayed by postponing a portion of municipal employee compensation
into the future. This form of borrowing is common for two reasons.
First, pensions are not subject to the same constitutional restrictions as
traditional, secured borrowing.112 Second, they were historically
funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, i.e., local governments simply paid

108. See Jeff Chapman, Adam Levin & Mark Robyn, States Contemplate
Borrowing to Help Manage Pandemic’s Fiscal Impact, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 9,

2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2020/06/09/statescontemplate-borrowing-to-help-manage-pandemics-fiscal-impact
[https://perma.cc/7DUK-C92Q]; Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Jeffery C. Mays & Jesse
McKinley, Virus Forces N.Y.C. to Consider Tactic That Nearly Led to Ruin in ‘75,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/nyregion/budgetborrow-coronavirus-ny.html [https://perma.cc/EB5P-GHJY].
109. See Liz Farmer, The 7 Deadly Sins of Public Finance, GOVERNING (June 2014),
https://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-deadly-public-finance-sins.html
[https://perma.cc/AGC8-5ZXV].
110. See Shanske & Gamage, supra note 20.
111. See IRIS J. LAV & ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, MISUNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING STATE DEBT, PENSIONS, AND RETIREE
HEALTH
COSTS
CREATE
UNNECESSARY
ALARM
2–4
(2011),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-20-11sfp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX3E-3R7R] (explaining the difference in pensions and municipal
debt).
112. See KIL HUH ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING
STATE
DEBT
2,
27
(2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2018/04/pew_strategies_managing_state_debt_april_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KKN-33SE].
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their pension obligations out of their annual budgets.113 The push to
pre-fund pension obligations began only in the 1970s and 1980s, as the
failure of private-sector pensions spurred regulatory reform in the
private sector and put pressure on public pensions to change their
practices.114
The scope of the municipal pension problem is a much-debated
question, as measuring the extent of underfunding requires making
assumptions about the future, and there is significant disagreement
about what assumptions are appropriate.115 Most analysts would
agree, however, that the COVID-19 recession has exacerbated existing
challenges and that there will be pressure on local governments to
reduce their payments to pension funds to resolve current budget
shortfalls.116 Whether or not this strategy makes sense in the short
term, existing pension liabilities certainly make additional borrowing
for operating expenses even less attractive. While solutions to local
pension problems are beyond the scope of this short Essay, it seems
likely that they will require at least some additional budget outlays
toward pension obligations.117 Such outlays will place additional
pressure on local budgets.

113. See
State
and
Local
Government
Pensions,
URB.
INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-financeinitiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-governmentpensions [https://perma.cc/JD82-2AFK] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
114. See id.
115. See Louise Sheiner, Are State and Local Pension Funds Really in Crisis?,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(July
15,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2019/07/15/are-state-and-local-pension-funds-really-in-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/U9HK-SFEC] (discussing various ways of assessing the problem and
how best to understand its magnitude).
116. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES: SHORTFALLS IN
FUNDING FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 5 (2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewcitypensi
onsreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW4G-C3B5] (finding no city in the sample had
funded more than 55% of retiree health care program, for example); Alison Felix,
Covid-19 Poses Risks for State and Local Public Pensions, FED. RSRV. BANK KAN.
CITY
(Aug.
19,
2020),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publications/research/eb/articles/2020/covid-posesrisks-state-local-public-pensions [https://perma.cc/983W-LNPQ]; Girard Miller, Public
Pensions and the Covid-19 Fiscal Dilemma, GOVERNING (July 7, 2020),
https://www.governing.com/finance/Public-Pensions-and-the-COVID-19-FiscalDilemma.html [https://perma.cc/S4NB-W9XW]; Mary Williams Walsh, Coronavirus Is
Making the Public Pension Crisis Even Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/business/coronavirus-public-pension.html
[https://perma.cc/CQ8M-MQVT].
117. See RICHARD W. JOHNSON & OWEN HAAGA, URB. INST., EVALUATING
PENSION REFORM OPTIONS WITH THE PUBLIC PENSION SIMULATOR: A CASE STUDY OF
PENNSYLVANIA
TEACHERS
12–14
(2017),
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In addition to increasing revenues and borrowing to close budget
gaps, local governments can also cut spending. In fact, spending cuts
are a common local response to revenue declines in a recession,118 and
at the state level, governments also often cut taxes during recessions.119
Even without these recessionary pressures, reductions in public
sector spending have long been a goal of conservative movement
activists.120 This theory of tax cuts is often referred to as the “starve
the beast” strategy.121 Tax cuts at the federal level have not
meaningfully reduced spending, as some conservatives have
bemoaned.122 At the state level, however, laws imposing restrictions
on tax rate increases have succeeded in both reducing spending and
shifting some costs onto local governments.123 Another study
concluded that local tax limits lead to increasing state aid; when limits
are placed on state governments, public spending overall is
constrained.124 Despite their mixed record of effectiveness, such limits

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89506/pension_simulator_report
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C95C-XXTN]; ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A COMMON-SENSE STRATEGY FOR FIXING STATE
PENSION
PROBLEMS
IN
TOUGH
ECONOMIC
TIMES
1
(2011),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/a-common-sense-strategy-for-fixing-state-pensionproblems-in-tough-economic-times [https://perma.cc/B5EH-ENK8]; 4 Best Practices
to
Address
the
Pension
Crisis,
GOVERNING
(Oct.
2,
2019),
https://www.governing.com/archive/4-Best-Practices-to-Address-the-PensionCrisis.html [https://perma.cc/336H-85TT].
118. See Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-localbudgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/8XBH-URPE].
119. See id.
120. See generally NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY
OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2017) (discussing efforts of
conservative activists to reverse the New Deal and renegotiate the role of government
in public life).
121. See generally Bruce Bartlett, “Starve the Beast”: Origins and Development of a
Budgetary Metaphor, 12 INDEP. REV. 5 (2007).
122. See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, “Starve the Beast” Does Not Work, CATO
POL’Y REP., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 2.
123. See TRACY M. GORDON, BROOKINGS INST., WHAT STATES CAN, AND CAN’T,
TEACH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ABOUT BUDGETS
10
(2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/03_states_budgets_gordon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XH4UTQHY].
124. See Mark Skidmore, Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships
Between State and Local Governments, 99 PUB. CHOICE 77–102 (1999); see also Joseph
Mengedoth & Santiago Pinto, Show and TEL: Are Tax Expenditure Limitations Effective?,
ECON
FOCUS
36,
38
(2015),
https://www.richmondfed.org//media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econ_focus/2015/q2/pdf/district_digest.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UU9E-E885] (discussing the difficulty of assessing TELS because of
variations in design and omitted variable problems).
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and associated calls for shrinking government budgets have long been
associated with conservative politics.
In the summer of 2020, however, the strength of the Black Lives
Matter protests amplified progressive voices urging significant
reductions in public safety expenditures.
In 2017, municipal
governments spent 13% of their budgets on their police departments.125
When accounting for municipal courts and municipally-funded
incarceration, the criminal justice budget increases to over 15% of
(Because counties primarily pay for
municipal budgets.126
incarceration, they spend almost 20% of their budgets on the criminal
justice system).127 A Bloomberg News analysis of cities suggested that
many large cities spend more than a quarter of their budgets on
police.128
Determining how much a community spends on policing compared
to other priorities can be difficult to disentangle. As Richard Auxier
explained, “a key challenge in translating police spending data is
merely our system of governance. In short, different governments
deliver different services — and it varies by state.”129 In Los Angeles,
both the city and the county engage in policing, but independent school
districts fund most public education,130 while New York City itself
funds both policing and schools directly.131 Public data on police
spending likely also does not account for the money local governments
spend litigating, settling, and paying out damages in police misconduct
cases.132 Such expenses are not trivial. Over a ten-year period, Chicago

125. See Criminal Justice Expenditures: Police, Corrections, and Courts, URB. INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-financeinitiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/criminal-justice-police-corrections-courtsexpenditures [https://perma.cc/EF4L-9JNQ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Sarah Holder, Fola Akinnibi & Christopher Cannon, ‘We Have Not
Defunded Anything’: Big Cities Boost Police Budgets, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Sept.
22, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-city-budget-police-defunding/
[https://perma.cc/5RTX-WL7T].
129. Richard C. Auxier, What Police Spending Data Can (and Cannot) Explain
Amid Calls to Defund the Police, URB. INST. (June 9, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/what-police-spending-data-can-and-cannotexplain-amid-calls-defund-police [https://perma.cc/M2B3-LC99].
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Even in Auxier’s comprehensive discussion of public safety budgets, such costs
do not appear to have been taken into account. See id.
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spent over a half-billion dollars in damage and settlement costs, and
additional money in litigation expenses.133
I support efforts to shift funding away from the criminal justice
system and toward human services expenditures. Such a shift would
both advance racial justice and local fiscal health. However, such
efforts are unlikely to provide a panacea for local revenue problems.
For one, such reductions remain an uphill battle. Though some cities,
like Austin, have made significant cuts to their police budgets,134 even
the high-profile efforts to cut the Minneapolis Police Department in
the wake of George Floyd’s murder have led to only a small shift in the
city’s budget.135 In many cities, police budgets have grown.136 Such
growth may represent path dependence as much as political will. Calls
to shift local funding priorities happened too late in many city budget
processes, and some cities had scheduled increases due to union
contracts.137
“Public safety” spending is often spared the full impact of budget
cuts that affect other city departments in times of economic decline.
During the Great Recession, for example, state and local governments
focused their spending reductions on education, health, and social
services.138 While there were cuts to police departments in many

133. See Cheryl Corley, Police Settlements: How the Cost of Misconduct Impacts
and
Taxpayers,
NPR
(Sept.
19,
2020,
7:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/19/914170214/police-settlements-how-the-cost-ofmisconduct-impacts-cities-and-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/A6WB-FS9M].
134. See Leif Reigstad, How Austin Cut One Third of Its Spending on the Police
TEX.
MONTHLY
(Nov.
17,
2020),
Department,
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/austin-police-department-defunding/
[https://perma.cc/C6RK-MSRV].
135. See Avie Schneider, Minneapolis Shifts $8 Million in Police Funding, But
Keeps Force at Current Level, NPR (Dec. 10, 2020, 1:41 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/10/944938471/minneapolis-shifts-8-million-in-policefunding-but-keeps-force-at-currentlevel#:~:text=DOJ%20Unveils%20New%20Initiative%20To,current%20888%2C%20
starting%20in%202022 [https://perma.cc/PXX9-2WFE].
136. See Holder et al., supra note 128.
137. See id.
138. See TRACY GORDON, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. & STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY
& INEQUALITY, STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS AND THE GREAT RECESSION 5 (2012),
https://web.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends-dev/cgibin/web/sites/all/themes/barron/pdf/StateBudgets_fact_sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M36W-UK4L].

Cities

2021]

CITIES ON THEIR OWN

943

jurisdictions,139 those cuts were not as deep as cuts to other
programs.140
That the fiscal shortfalls caused by the current COVID-19 recession
have not resulted in meaningful reductions in police spending suggests
the magnitude of the problem. For example, Chicago, facing one of
the largest shortfalls in the country, closed much of its budget gap by
refinancing existing loans.141 Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot rejected
calls to defund the police, reaching a deal to make cuts only by
attrition.142 In fact, the ultimate budget that passed included an
increase in revenue from traffic and public safety code enforcement.143
As discussed previously, local reliance on these fines and fees is an
inequitable way of raising revenue.
Further, unfunded pension obligations mean that even significant
decreases in current police spending will not allow cities to quickly shift
their spending priorities, as cities need revenue to pay for the already
incurred pension obligations of police officers.144 Resolving these
pension problems will take creativity on the part of local elected and
union officials.

139. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., THE
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE AGENCIES (2011),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0713-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LP998JU].
140. See Adam H. Langley, Local Government Finances During and After the
Great Recession, in LAND AND THE CITY 14–15 (George W. McCarthy, Gregory K.
Ingram & Samuel A. Moody eds., 2014).
141. See Shruti Singh, Chicago Passes $12.8 Billion Budget with More Taxes,
(Nov.
24,
2020,
4:48
PM),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-24/chicago-passes-12-8-billionbudget-with-more-taxes-refinancing [https://perma.cc/RNW3-UKE7].
142. See Heather Cherone, City Council Approves Lightfoot’s $12.8 Billion Budget
— with 22 ‘No’ Votes, WWTW (Nov. 24, 2020, 4:50 PM),
https://news.wttw.com/2020/11/24/city-council-approves-lightfoots-128-billion-budget
[https://perma.cc/LBQ8-YALT]; Alex V. Hernandez, Maxwell Evans & Kelly Bauer,

As Cities Across the Country Slash Police Funding, It’s Unlikely to Happen in Chicago
with Mayor Not on Board, Aldermen Say, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (June 9, 2020, 8:29 AM),

https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/06/09/chicago-police-budget-funding-lightfootprogressive-caucus-cpd-defund-police/ [https://perma.cc/QR35-B4WR]; Dana Kozlov,

Mayor Lightfoot’s Budget Proposal Calls for Cuts to Police Budget, but Mayor
Remains Against Defunding Police, CBS CHI. (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:24 PM),

https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/10/21/mayor-lightfoots-budget-proposal-calls-forcuts-to-police-budget-but-mayor-remains-against-defunding-police/
[https://perma.cc/7Z4P-V598].
143. See Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s ‘Pandemic Budget’ for 2021, supra note 95.
144. See Heather Gillers & Andrea Fuller, Cities Weigh Cutting Police Budgets and
Discover How Hard That Is, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2020, 3:38 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-weigh-cutting-police-budgets-and-discover-howhard-that-is-11597261079 [https://perma.cc/2ZSL-N6YH].
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III. A WAY FORWARD

As cities seek options for a more stable fiscal path going forward,
reforming city revenue sources should be a central part of the agenda.
As discussed above, re-prioritizing local spending is an important part
of the budget conversation, but it is likely that once federal aid stops
flowing, cities may find themselves continuing to face fiscal challenges.
What then is the path forward? Cities need access to better designed,
broad-based taxes. Miscellaneous revenue is not an effective tax
system, and reliance on these sources creates a host of problems and
challenges.
Advocates and policymakers interested in local revenue should
continue to pursue changes in the property tax that would both grant
local governments more control over property tax revenue and make
the property tax more efficient, but calls for such reforms should be
complemented by advocacy and research focused on expanding local
legal authority to impose income and sales taxes. There are currently
18 states that provide only property tax authorization for local
governments and one state that authorizes only a sales tax.145 Only one
state, Alabama, authorizes all three broad-based taxes for local
governments.146
An additional five cities have such authorization even though other
local governments in their state do not: New York City, Yonkers,
Philadelphia, Kansas City, and St. Louis.147 The list of cities that
provide expanded fiscal authority perhaps offers its own cautionary
tale. While New York City’s tax base allowed it to significantly expand
its budget prior to the pandemic, the city still has unresolved pension
and retirement benefits issues,148 and Philadelphia experienced a
period of significant fiscal distress that led to a nearly three-decade
period of state oversight over local finances.149 That state supervision
is set to expire,150 but even prior to the pandemic, experts at the Pew
Charitable Trusts Philadelphia Research project noted that “[f]iscal

145. See Pagano & Hoene, supra note 6.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See John Hunt, Reforming New York City’s Public Retirement System,
MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/reformingnew-york-city-public-retirement-system [https://perma.cc/A3WT-WELR].
149. See The Future of Fiscal Oversight in Philadelphia, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.
(Jan.
7,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2020/01/the-future-of-fiscal-oversight-in-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/YE855NRV].
150. See id. at 2.
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responsibility, spending, and taxes continue[] to be major concerns for
Philadelphia’s government.”151 St. Louis has authority to impose a
variety of taxes, but state constitutional restrictions require the city to
seek voter approval to raise tax rates, constraining revenue growth.152
Plainly, the legal authority to impose any property, sales, or income tax
is not sufficient to provide for local fiscal health; the taxes themselves
(and thus their statutory authorization) must also be well-designed.
Philadelphia’s story is illustrative. No one suggests Philadelphia as
a model city for local budgets or revenue. Philadelphia’s property tax
has long been criticized for its poor design. The state’s constitutional
uniformity provision makes it legally impossible for the city to impose
Thus,
different tax rates on different classes of property.153
homeowners and commercial property owners face the same tax rates,
limiting the ability of the city to raise additional property tax
revenue.154
State law allows Philadelphia, and no other city in the state, to
impose an additional local sales tax, 155 but Philadelphia’s sales tax
mirrors the state’s.156 In an effort to compete with neighboring
Delaware, which imposes no sales tax, Pennsylvania is one of a handful
of states that exempts most clothing purchases from the sales tax, and,
like in most states, the sales tax also does not apply to most services.157
As a result of shifts in personal consumption,158 Pennsylvania’s sales
tax applies to a decreasing share of consumer expenditures.

151. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA 2019: THE STATE OF THE CITY 57
(2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/08/sotc_2019_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L8N4-Q4AZ].
152. See Fitch Affirms St. Louis, MO’s IDR at ‘A-’ and Municipal Finance Corp.
Lease Revenue Bonds at ‘BBB+,’ FITCH RATINGS (June 5, 2020, 3:52 PM),
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/us-public-finance/fitch-affirms-st-louis-mo-idrat-a-municipal-finance-corp-lease-revenue-bonds-at-bbb-05-06-2020
[https://perma.cc/V6YY-QPE8].
153. See PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
154. See Property Tax Relief in Pennsylvania, PA. BUDGET & POL’Y CTR. (May 12,
2015),
https://www.pennbpc.org/property-tax-relief-pennsylvania
[https://perma.cc/H7X4-XSVN].
155. See Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax, PA. DEP’T REVENUE,
https://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Infor
mation/SUT/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/X38E-RB4X] (last visited Feb. 17,
2021).
156. See id.
157. See Pennsylvania Sales Tax Guide for Businesses, TAXJAR,
https://www.taxjar.com/states/pennsylvania-sales-tax-online/#do-you-have-sales-taxnexus-in-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/7PDA-M7XU] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
158. See Table 2.4.5 Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product,
BUREAU
ECON.
ANALYSIS
(July
31,
2020),
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Finally, “local income taxes” in Pennsylvania are imposed on the
narrow base of wage income, leading Philadelphia to impose additional
business taxes to capture revenue from some pass-through
businesses.159 The narrowness of the wage tax base is criticized by
progressives, and the array of small business taxes vexes business
owners.160 The system is so complicated that the tax-skeptical Tax
Foundation has endorsed the city moving toward a broader, more
traditional income tax base.161 Thus, just as local reliance on the
property tax has been made more difficult by state-imposed limits on
assessment growth, rate changes, and revenue growth, state law also
can impose poor design-choices on local general sales and local income
taxes.
Further, for some jurisdictions, access to new, more reliable sources
of revenue will not be enough to combat years of reduced fiscal
capacity. Historian Destin Jenkins has described how, in the wake of
white flight from cities, borrowing costs for these jurisdictions
increased, making the cost of investing in public infrastructure much
higher.162 As a result, residents in these jurisdictions faced a greater
tax burden.163 Because the historical default rate of cities is incredibly
low, these discrepancies were likely not justified by increased credit
risk.164 Concerns for city fiscal health cannot ignore the ways local
fiscal health reflects longstanding racial inequities that make it
impossible for even expanded local taxing authority to provide needed
public services in many urban communities.

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1
&1921=survey [https://perma.cc/QQR2-ZJUW].
159. See, e.g., Business Income & Receipts Tax (BIRT), CITY OF PHILA. (Jan. 28,
2021),
https://www.phila.gov/services/payments-assistance-taxes/businesstaxes/business-income-receipts-tax-birt/ [https://perma.cc/HP78-2F7L] (discussing the
Business Income and Receipts Tax); Net Profits Tax, CITY OF PHILA. (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.phila.gov/services/payments-assistance-taxes/business-taxes/net-profitstax/ [https://perma.cc/ZMX5-7MQ3] (discussing the Net Profits Tax).
160. See Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Is the Philadelphia Wage Tax
Unconstitutional? And If It Is, What Can and Should the City Do?, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
163 (2016).
161. See Jared Walczak, Nicole Kaeding & Scott Drenkard, Pennsylvania: A 21st
Century Tax Code for the Commonwealth, TAX FOUND. 1–2 (2018),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180904165153/PA_RB_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E27B-MCNV].
162. See Destin Jenkins, The Fed Could Undo Decades of Damage to Cities. Here’s
How.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
27,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/27/fed-could-undo-decadesdamage-cities-heres-how/ [https://perma.cc/R5EM-RUMN].
163. See id.
164. See id.
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Other historic and continuing inequities are reflected in the high
poverty rates in many of the United States’ urban areas. For example,
the poverty rate in Flint, Michigan, is almost 40%;165 in 2018, the
poverty rate in Shreveport-Bossier (the third-largest metro area in
Louisiana) was 22.2%.166 In these communities, poverty both creates a
need for significant public investment in social services and limits the
ability of the city to raise own-source revenue. Where property values
are low, communities must impose high property tax rates to raise
revenue. Such high tax rates can result in foreclosures of owneroccupied housing in low-income communities, further eroding the tax
base and increasing economic instability in these communities.167 Such
poverty rates also limit the revenue potential of local sales and income
taxes.
For these jurisdictions, increased state and federal spending is
necessary. Only a portion of this investment would need to be in the
form of intragovernmental aid. The expanded federal funding of antipoverty programs contained in the American Recovery Plan is an
important first step toward address the human services needs in these
communities; reducing poverty would go a long way to improving fiscal
outcomes in many areas, both urban and rural. At the same time,
ensuring the equitable provision of basic local services, such as water
and fire services, likely requires intra-government aid to supplement
locally raised revenue.
CONCLUSION

The National League of City’s 21st Century Home Rule project, on
which I am a co-author, recommends states provide a fiscal equity
provision to home rule law that guarantees state support to provide a
minimal level of local services.168 Whether or not such a legal
guarantee is enacted, some urban areas will need additional investment
in one form or another. Thus, this Essay ends where it begins. While
some urban areas can survive and thrive in an era of unreliable

165. See
Flint
City,
Michigan,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=1600000US2629000 [https://perma.cc/CM8LCEGW] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
166. See Shreveport-Bossier City, LA: Metro Area, CENSUS REP.,
https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US43340-shreveport-bossier-city-la-metroarea/ [https://perma.cc/KTX5-XC6E] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
167. See Atuahene, supra note 54, at 114–15.
168. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 37 (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-RulePrinciples-ReportWEB-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J2N-RN6L].
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federalism, many other urban communities need investments that
likely can only be made by state and federal governments. Reforms to
local revenue authority and a reinvigorated system of fiscal federalism
will be necessary to help all communities thrive. Hopefully we are at
the precipice of such changes.

